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Abstract
Does power corrupt? Scholars have examined this causality with mixed results. This
study uses the World Value Survey (WVS) database to examine the power-corruption
link across cultures and time. The WVS inquires respondents’ justification for moral
domains of purity/sanctity, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity. Power is
operationalized as belonging to the upper-class. The study provides evidence that
the upper-class respondents are significantly more justifying of breaking moral rules
across world regions. But results also indicate that morality of upper classes is
diverging with time from the rest of the population, narrowing in some countries,
and widening in others. A discussion on the implications of these findings and the
need to monitor the morality of those in power is provided.
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Introduction 
“Power corrupts.” Socrates’ apothegm appears even more valid today1. Scandals pertaining 
to morality repeatedly occur among government heads, business leaders, sports 
champions, spiritual leaders of various religious denominations, elite scholars, and 
celebrities. Is it merely those scandals are more often reported in recent years, or are our 
elites increasingly likely to succumb to temptation and corruption? How bad is the situation?  
This study uses social class as a proxy for power, and especially focuses on the link between 
upper-class appurtenance and morality. The article is organized in three sections: first, I 
provide definitions of morality, power in general, and power obtained from ones’ group 
appurtenance. Especially of interest here is social class, whose appurtenance is associated 
to a change in morality. In the second section, I summarize the literature that associates 
morality domains (Moral Foundation Theory; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 1995; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004) to individual power first, and then to social class. I then use the World Value 
Survey (WVS), a database of self-reported values from 99 countries, to closely examine if 
upper-class respondents from each country differ from their fellow countrymen and women 
in the assessment of cheating, respecting rules, and sexual behaviors. In conclusion, I 
assess the validity of the “power corrupts” adage across time.  
Theories on Morality and Power 
What is Morality? 
Defining morality is never easy, as attested by the endless list of philosophers who have 
tried. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, and later Karl Marx, men are good by 
nature but can potentially become depraved by society, thus requiring a social contract. 
These thoughts led to the principles of universal human rights to enjoy freedom and self-
determination. The utilitarianism school of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill focused on 
the inner moral inclination toward empathic feelings; the alleviation of suffering should be 
the source of all morality. Such thoughts have led to anti-slavery movements, women’s 
emancipation, and the “right to pursue happiness” enshrined in the US constitution.  
Developmental psychologists also located the origin of moral thoughts either in a social 
contract or in the individuals’ inner ability to reciprocate and treat others equally (for reviews 
see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; and Wendorf, 2001). Piaget and Kohlberg 
recognized that, together with the cognitive development stages of children, emerges the 
ability to understand (culture specific) moral issues and to behave accordingly (Kohlberg, 
1973, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1948). However, Kohlberg together with Turiel further argue that 
the most advanced form of morality goes beyond blind acceptance of social conventions: 
the experience of Nazi Germany demonstrates that it is in the capacity to reject social rules, 
                                               
1  In the Republic (Book VIII), Plato explains how political leaders become corrupted by power, thus 
leading to tyranny.  
3
Cachia: Upper Classes and Immorality
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
 authority, and loyalty to one’s in-group where lays a true morality, one based on life, justice, 
and liberty, at the apex or “principled” level of cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1973; Turiel, 
1966, 1983).  
The “empiricist view” that morality is learnt from childhood has been challenged by a 
“nativist view” (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004) that argues morality precedes education, and is 
ingrained in the human mind as an outcome of evolution (Darwin, 1859). Evolutionary 
psychologists have proposed morality evolved among humans to regulate group functioning 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). For example, humans have developed inner abilities to detect 
cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), laying the moral ground for equity (i.e., others should 
be treated with fairness and justice; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and they have evolved the ability 
to care for group members, laying the moral ground for empathy (i.e., one should be kind 
and compassionate with others; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). From this nativist standpoint, moral 
judgments come to mind without rational thinking; they elicit emotional reactions (Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Haidt, 2003; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009; 
Turner & Stets, 2007) and they are intuitive (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Haidt 
& Joseph, 2004). Therefore, defining morality solely along the dimensions of life, justice, and 
liberty, as proposed by Kohlberg and Turiel might be particular to WEIRD (western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), liberal, 
and Judeo-Christian societies.  
Starting from moral intuitions and enlarging their sample to include various cultures, Haidt 
and Joseph observed that morality involves a wide range of social regulations beyond just 
equity and empathy (2004). This new line of research, also called the Moral Foundation 
Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 1995; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) suggests five 
universally observable domains of moral judgment: harm/care (with empathy at its core), 
fairness/reciprocity (which covers equity), in-group/loyalty (which prioritizes same-group 
members and self-sacrifice for the group), authority/respect (concerned with order and social 
hierarchy), and purity/sanctity (related with physical or spiritual contagion and disgust, 
sexual chastity and desire). These domains have been grouped into individualizing 
foundations, i.e., harm and fairness, and socially binding foundations, i.e., respect for 
authority, loyalty to group, and purity (Weber & Federico, 2013).  
Therefore, a multi-dimensional definition of morality is required to ensure cross-
cultural validity of a morality study. Because the strength and types of social bonds differ 
across cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010), the 
characteristics of morality, as of the social contract, also vary across cultures (Rai & Fiske, 
2011). For example, Confucianism, the founding moral philosophy in many Asian societies, 
treats the respect for hierarchy and authority as its highest virtue, at the apex of morality 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003). Studies in India (e.g., Mahalingam, 2007), among 
liberals and conservatives in the USA (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), or lower classes 
in Brazil and the USA (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Diaz, 1993), indicate various levels of moral 
concerns about purity, degradation, hierarchical deference and loyalty to a national or ethnic 
group. Although research on the ethology of mammalian species suggests empathy, respect 
for authority, and equity might have been inherited from our pre-human ancestors (de Waal, 
1982, 2006), the relative importance given to each moral domain varies with social 
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 environment. For these reasons, this cross-cultural study will use the moral foundation 
theory as a cross-cultural framework to analyze morality.  
Power at the Individual Level and its Paradox 
Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche, and more recent psychologists (e.g., 
McClelland, 1961, 1970, 1975; Winter, 1973, 1991) recognized that individuals have a 
motivation for power. Social hierarchy provides the evolved advantages of enhancing 
cooperation and coordination in the group among primates (de Waal, 1982), and human 
children as well (e.g., Barkow et al., 1975).  
But psychologists have also warned that power should be channeled into responsible 
behaviors, or it might just be used to increase personal gain (Winter, 1991). Maner and Mead 
(2010) describe power-holding as a paradoxical social contract: instead of using one’s 
asymmetric resources to benefit the group in totality, the powerful could potentially use their 
position for self-benefit (or that of one’s family) at the expense of the larger group. As the 
social contract in a society is embedded in moral rules and regulations, whether or not those 
in power respect the social contract translates into whether or not they share morality with 
the group. For those in power, moral deviance shall thus be considered as breaking their 
end of the social contract. But power is not always granted according to characteristics such 
as physical strength, ability to form coalitions, and personality traits. More commonly, power 
derives from social structures (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004).  
The Link Between Individual and Social Power  
Although power has been defined as the ability to do (Berdahl & Martonara, 2006), or to 
choose (Ng, 1980), prevalent definitions are centered on interpersonal relationships: the 
ability to make others do (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015), to influence others (Copeland, 1994; 
French & Raven, 1959), or to manipulate others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003: 
Kipnis, 1972). But power is not only the ability to influence others; it also stems from one’s 
group appurtenance.  
According to social identity theory, individuals define their identity from the group 
they belong to (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and derive self-esteem from the relative ranking of 
their group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). One key characteristic of 
social groups is their power entitlement: genders, classes, castes, clans, economic and 
educational standings, as well as kinship structures involve social ranking (Bourdieu, 1991), 
which individuals are readily able to recognize (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & 
Chatman, 2006). Such willingness to maintain hierarchy among social groups appears to be 
an evolved human capacity (Barkow et al., 1975), theorized as social dominance (Sidanius 
et al., 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). In a word, group appurtenance is an indicator 
of social power.  
Finally, individual power leads to group power. Not only are groups of individuals with 
power, by simple aggregation, more powerful than other groups, but also individual- and 
group-identities are both linked to individuals’ appreciation of social hierarchy. For example, 
individuals with high social dominance orientation (i.e., endorsement of social hierarchy) 
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 tend to choose careers in organizations with hierarchical structures (e.g., army and police) 
rather than horizontal structures (e.g., civil liberty organizations; Haley & Sidanius, 2005; 
Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003). And the sense of power is consistent across 
social interactions (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2011; Kenny & Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro, Foti, 
& Kenny, 1991). In sum, power at individual- and group-level is interconnected. 
Social Class as Power 
Social class has a profound effect on social life (Durkheim, 1802/1984; Fiske & Markus, 
2011; Marx & Engels, 1848/1973). According to the class struggle theory (Marx & Engels, 
1848/1973), social groups are formed according to their ability to obtain and maintain 
asymmetric access to economic and political resources, a definition that directly echoes that 
of power at the individual level. In the US, perceived power and social class are significantly 
correlated (Anderson et al., 2006).  
Evidence also shows that social classes affect health, cognitive functioning, and 
behavior. Social classes emerge through shared experience—at school, at work, or in 
marriage, with individuals from the same social background—and it determines one’s 
access to resources (Oakes & Rossi, 2003) and freedom of choice (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; 
Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Moreover, social class appurtenance strongly 
correlates to health (Adler et al., 1994; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) and social 
anxiety (Wilkinson, 1999). When exposed to nasal drops of rhinovirus and influenza virus, 
healthy subjects who perceive that they belong to a lower social class (subjective measure), 
but not those with lower salary (objective measure of social class) presented significantly 
more symptoms of cold and clinical illness (Cohen, Alper, Doyle, Adler, & Treanor, 2008). 
Furthermore, parental socioeconomic status (SES) appears to affect children’s health, itself 
leading to children having lower SES at adult age (Currie, 2009).  
Social class appurtenance also affects cognition and behavior. Members of the 
higher social classes tend to essentialize social categories and behaviors as inherent and 
stable, based on ingrained and genetic characteristics of individuals (Keller, 2005), while 
members of the lower classes tend to contextualize social categories and behaviors as 
flexible and constructed by social experience (Kraus, 2010; Mahalingam, 2003, 2007). Thus, 
higher-class members tend to favor personal abilities and neglect social 
interconnectedness. Studies on agency indicate that working (lower) class respondents 
favor social conformity and connection to others when performing the task of choosing a 
pen, while middle class respondents would rather opt for differentiation (Stephens et al., 
2007). In another study on agency, Hurricane Katrina survivors were asked what guided 
their choice of staying or evacuating. Those who evacuated (who were mostly of a higher 
SES) were guided by a sense of independence and control, whereas those who refused to 
evacuate (who were mostly of a lower SES) were guided by interdependence, strength, and 
faith (Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009).  
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 Morality, Individual Power, and Social Class  
The next section reviews the literature on the link of morality with individual power and with 
social class. These two areas of study (i.e., individual power-morality, and social class-
morality) have typically been two distinct fields of social psychology. But because individual- 
and social class-levels of analysis are different, though highly interconnected, the two fields 
deserve to be compared. The review is conducted separately for the five moral foundation 
domains.  
Harm/Care Domain 
Harm/care and individual power. The infamous Stanford prison experiment and the 
Milgram experiment at Yale University exemplify the extent to which bluntly immoral harming 
of others by empowered individuals becomes possible (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; 
Milgram, 1963). Altogether, 13.6% of US workers have reported being abused by 
supervisors, including sexual harassment, physical violence, public ridiculing, etc. (Tepper, 
2007). A large amount of studies have shown that, in experimental settings or in 
organizations, individuals given power, or primed with power, tend to have less empathy for 
others (for a summary see Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). Those given power tend to 
dehumanize or objectify others (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Gwinn, Judd, & 
Park, 2013). Dehumanization itself is correlated to a greater willingness to torture in prison 
settings (Haney et al., 1973; Milgram, 1963; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). Individuals given 
power over others tend to manipulate them (Kipnis, 1972), to express less compassion, 
ignoring distress and suffering of others (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012; van 
Kleef, Oveis, van der Löwe, LuoKogan, & Goetz, 2008), and tend to punish more severely 
in retributive justice settings (van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer, 2014) compared to 
individuals with less power.  
Conversely, a handful of studies provide the opposite evidence that individual power 
might improve moral judgment in the harm/care domain. For instance, power might increase 
interpersonal sensitivity (Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 
2009), and those empowered might become altruistic, if they are other-oriented (Blader & 
Chen, 2012; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001), or if they are directed toward interpersonal 
tasks (Copeland, 1994; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006). Finally, those in power are more 
willing to help in situations of distress, as the less powerful are typically waiting for someone 
to lead (Whitson, Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, & Liljenquist, 2007).  
 
Harm/care and social class. At the social class level, the assessment of the harm/care 
moral foundation is more balanced. First, children’s moral development stages increase with 
SES across cultures (Gibbs et al., 2007; Snarey, 1985). Higher SES children have more 
“principled” levels of moral judgment: they are more passionate and empathic (Kohlberg, 
1973; Turiel, 1966, 1983). High SES individuals in the USA also volunteer more than lower 
classes (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005).  
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 However, various studies indicate higher social class might be associated to more harming 
and less caring. Higher SES individuals are less likely to “moralize” their behavior than lower 
SES individuals (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Baretto, & Leach, 2008). Upper-class members’ 
economic autonomy and personal agency make them depend on others less than lower 
classes do (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens et al., 2007). In chaotic situations, for 
example, high SES individuals bank on their personal wealth, while lower class members 
lean on their community (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). More 
directly, high SES individuals in the USA display lower levels of compassion than low SES 
respondents (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012) and manifest less empathic accuracy 
(Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). In a cooperation exercise, upper-class respondents give 
40% less to anonymous partners, they are less trusting of others, less helpful to distressed 
experimenters (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), they direct less attention to other 
participants, have less eye contact, and laugh less (Kraus & Keltner, 2009) than lower class 
respondents. They are also on average less polite with strangers than the lower classes 
(Argyle, 1994). Moreover, upper-class members in the USA give on average 2.2% of their 
income to charitable organization, whereas poorer class members give 4.6%, although a 
larger percent of upper classes (70% vs. 30% for lower classes) do give (James & Sharpe, 
2007). Finally, the individual measures of social dominance orientation (SDO), which is 
higher among upper social classes (Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000), was negatively 
correlated to the harm/care moral foundation (Federico, et al., 2013).  
Fairness/Reciprocity Domain 
Fairness/reciprocity and individual power. At the individual level, those in power tend to 
satisfy their own needs at the expense of others (Keltner et al., 2003) and several studies 
provide evidence of this non-equalitarian propensity (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & 
Ceranic, 2012; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). Having power was 
also correlated to cheating more if the power situation was stable (Kim, Shin, & Lee, 2015).  
 
Fairness/reciprocity and social class. By definition, social hierarchy implies unequal 
situations and therefore, less fairness and reciprocity between members of various social 
classes. Ideologies that promote social hierarchy (e.g., social dominance) tend to support 
inequality in society at large, and thereby tend to promote and legitimate prejudices and 
discrimination (Sidanius et al., 2000). The inclination of upper-class members to validate 
and justify inequality in an essentialist manner further legitimates social inequality (Keller, 
2005; Kraus, 2010; Mahalingam, 2003, 2007). More directly, high SES is correlated to lower 
fairness/reciprocity: upper-class members are more selfish (Dubois, et al., 2015). In 
experiments, high SES individuals took more sweets intended for children, were more likely 
to cheat in online games, and to lie in negotiation (Piff et al., 2012). Although this study has 
been criticized (Francis, 2012), high SES also correlated to being more self-serving, and low 
SES correlated to redistribution, especially if high SES individuals also have strong upper-
body strength (Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2013).  
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 In-group/loyalty Domain 
In-group/loyalty and individual power. Individuals given power feel more distant from 
others (Kipnis, 1972; Lammers, et al., 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013), implying the weakness 
of any possible link between power and in-group loyalty. For example, individuals with high 
power confirm less the opinion of others when making a decision (Galinsky, Magee, 
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). However, a direct measure of the relationship 
between in-group loyalty and individual power has yet to be conducted.  
 
In-group/loyalty and social class. Social class, as demonstrated above, has a bearing on 
individuals’ perception of in-group appurtenance: studies have shown that upper social class 
members are more independent, have a higher sense of control, and are less prosocial in 
general than lower class members (e.g., Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). No prior study, 
however, tested if these conclusions apply to in-groups. Overall, the connection between in-
group loyalty and social class is not clear. Social dominance theory sheds a little more light: 
Group appurtenance in general is the source of in-group bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner 
et al., 1987). For those with high SDO, e.g., upper-class members (Sidanius et al., 2000), 
in-group bias is further enhanced (Pratto et al., 2006). Not only do legitimating myths of 
social ranking increase bias among those in high social strata, but also the combination of 
high SDO and high group-identification increases discrimination against out-group 
subordinates (Pratto et al., 2006). Although a study shows that high SDO does not directly 
correlate to in-group loyalty (Federico et al., 2013), evidence indicates that SDO enhances 
in-groups’ hierarchical ranking (Haley & Sidanius, 2005).  
Authority/Respect Domain 
Authority/respect and individual power. The authority/respect domain is associated with 
duties, obedience, respect, and maintenance of traditions (Graham et al., 2011). Powerful 
individuals are expected to promote rules and regulations, not only to simplify decision-
making processes (for cognitive ease; Fiske, 1993), but also because rules reinforce the 
status quo (Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, & van Laar, 1996; Sidanius et al., 2004). In parallel, 
the literature gathered ample evidence that those in power tend to become disinhibited and 
therefore less respectful of social conveniences, rules, and regulations (Galinsky, Jordan, & 
Sivanathan, 2008), whereas powerless individuals are more sensitive to threat and 
punishment (Fiske, 1993). The approach/inhibition reasoning (Keltner et al., 2003) proposes 
that powerful individuals are ready to take more risks (such as breaking rules), than 
powerless individuals (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008).  
 
Authority/respect and social class. Both the Marxist concept of class struggle (Marx & 
Engels, 1848/1973; Marx, 1844/1964) and social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 2006; 
Sidanius et al., 2004) propose that social hierarchy is maintained by those with higher rank. 
Because dominant ideologies support the power system in place (Foucault & Gordon, 1980), 
upper-class members would promote a moral foundation based on duties, traditions, and 
obedience to secure compliance of the less powerful. However, evidence that social power 
may enhance adherence to social rules is mixed. On the contrary, elevated social rank may 
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 reduce threat sensitivity and increase sense of control (Kraus et al., 2012), thereby reducing 
threat-driven obedience to rules and regulations: high SES individuals tend to make more 
driving infractions and exhibit more unethical behavior (Piff et al., 2012), especially when 
that behavior benefits them (vs. others), and when their power was enhanced (Dubois et al., 
2015). This result, however, was not replicated with a large Dutch sample (Trautmann, van 
de Kuilen, & Zeckhauser, 2013). The researchers explain the cultural variation by the 
difference in the type of unethical behavior tested: the wealthier may cheat significantly more 
on taxes, but they may not steal cars (nor cheat on social welfare, or in a trust game) more 
than poorer individuals might. Results on social dominance are also mixed. High SDO 
individuals endorse hierarchy and tend to choose careers in hierarchical organizations, 
where respect of authority is required, such as the police or military (Haley & Sidanius, 
2005). Person-occupation congruence (potentially expressed as respect for authority on the 
job) increases efficacy at work (Sidanius et al., 1996). But the direct correlation between 
SDO and the authority/respect moral foundation was not observed (Federico et al., 2013).  
Purity/Sanctity Domain 
Purity/sanctity and individual power. The purity/sanctity domain is associated with moral 
judgment founded on physical or spiritual contagion, disgust, chastity, and desire (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004). Individuals in power do not particularly curb their desire, as having power is 
associated to more sexual harassment behaviors (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995). 
But studies that inquire directly into the link between purity- and sanctity-related moral 
judgments and individual power have yet to be conducted.  
 
Purity/sanctity and social class. On the link between social class and purity/sanctity, one 
rare study indicates that higher classes tend to “moralize” purity less than lower classes 
(Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). However the direct measure of purity/sanctity 
moral foundation was not correlated to social dominance (Federico et al., 2013). More 
studies have observed a link between political orientation (conservative vs. liberal) and the 
moral domain of purity/sanctity, but social class was not included in these studies.  
Hypotheses 
Although abundant and highly informative, research on the link between morality and 
power/social class needs to be complimented. Its main weakness is that it was conducted 
in WEIRD societies (Henrich et al., 2010) for the most part, and therefore lacks cross-cultural 
validity (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011). Morality rules express the terms of the social contract 
that is specific to that of each culture (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). For example, 
cultural variations in hierarchical and vertical dimensions (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & 
Gelfand, 1995) might promote individualizing vs. socially binding moral foundations. The 
acceptance of social hierarchy might also influence morality (e.g., Oyserman, 2006).  
The main objective of this inquiry is to confirm if perceived appurtenance to upper 
social classes affects moral judgments in all cultures similarly. As the great majority of prior 
studies have observed a lower rating in empathy/compassion and equity/fairness among the 
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 upper classes, I hypothesize that these results can be extrapolated across cultures, and to 
all moral domains because power increases the sense of personal control and reduces 
socially binding behaviors (the “unrestricted” low morality hypothesis).  
The process of modernization leads to changes in values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
According to these authors, industrialization leads to the replacement of traditional forms of 
authority (e.g., religion) with secular forms (e.g., government) in a first step, before all forms 
of authority are eventually replaced by emancipated individualization in the postmodern step 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Applying this rationale, the upper classes in highly industrialized 
societies might adhere more to individualizing moral foundations such as equity and 
empathy, than to socially binding moral foundations such as authority, purity, and in-group 
loyalty (the “selective” low morality hypothesis).  
 
Table 1. 
Regions, Sub-regions and Countries sampled in the WVS (WVS, 2015; Geoscheme, 
2006) 
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania 
Eastern 
Africa: 
Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, 
Zimbabwe, 
Uganda, 
Tanzania, 
Zambia. 
 
North Africa:  
Algeria, Libya, 
Egypt, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia. 
 
South Africa: 
South Africa. 
 
Western 
Africa:  
Ghana, Mali, 
Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso.  
 
Central 
America:  
El Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Mexico. 
 
Latin 
America: 
Dominican 
Republic, 
Puerto Rico, 
Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
 
North 
America: 
Canada, USA. 
 
South 
America: 
Argentine, 
Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Peru, 
Uruguay, 
Venezuela.  
 
Central Asia:  
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan. 
 
East Asia:  
China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea. 
 
South East Asia:  
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, Viet 
Nam, Thailand. 
 
Southern Asia  
Bangladesh, India, 
Iran, Pakistan. 
 
Western Asia:  
Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Bahrain, 
Cyprus, Georgia, 
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Yemen.  
Eastern Europe:  
Bulgaria, Belarus, 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, 
Ukraine. 
 
Northern Europe: 
Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Great Britain 
 
Southern Europe: 
Albania, Andorra, 
Bosnia, Croatia, 
Italy, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Macedonia, 
Serbia & 
Montenegro. 
 
Western Europe:  
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland.  
Oceania:  
Australia, 
New 
Zealand. 
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 Measuring Class Power and Morality 
The World Value Survey  
The association between social class and morality is examined using data from the several 
rounds of the WVS. The strength of the WVS is in its global coverage. The WVS includes 
representative samples of 99 countries (Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998), altogether 
representing 90% of the world population (WVS, 2015). Although the WVS dataset does not 
include the wide variety of sub-cultures or lifestyles existing in each country, this large 
sample of 340,000 individuals provides an unrivaled sample of national cultures with diverse 
economic-development levels, political systems, religious beliefs, social practices, as well 
as diversity in ethnic and genetic factors. In this study, the concept of culture is therefore 
understood as countries or national cultures. The countries are further grouped into five 
regions and 18 geographical sub-regions (see Table 1) using the United Nations 
Geoscheme classification (Geoscheme, 2006).  
Furthermore, the WVS was obtained in six waves, from 1981-1984 to 2010-2014. 
Each wave contains a different sample of countries: The first wave in 1981-1984 includes 
eight countries (n = 10,307) and the last one in 2010-2014 includes 60 countries (n = 
86,272). When a country appears in several waves, each wave is analyzed as one dataset, 
because culture evolves with time. The dataset for each country and wave is called “case” 
thereafter.  
The WVS Measure of Social Class 
The World Value Survey (WVS, 2015) database provides a (self-reported) measure of social 
class. Respondents are asked to rate the social class to which they belong on a Likert scale, 
ranging from lower-class, then working-class, middle-class (lower- and upper-middle-class 
in few studies), to finally upper-class. Self-reported identification with the upper-class (UC) 
ranges from 0.1% (Latvia and Burkina Faso) to 6.9% (Israel) of the respondents per country 
(2.2% of the full sample or n = 6,702 respondents).  
To characterize the upper-class respondents of the full sample, their gender, age, 
education, and income levels were compared with the rest of the sample (Table 2), using a 
Welch t-test (for unequal variance; Welch, 1947). Overall, respondents who identified as 
upper-class fit a broad definition of elites whose power rests largely on economic resources 
and high education. This study focuses on the subjective perception of upper-class 
appurtenance. Research has shown that subjective feelings of power are enough to modify 
attitudes (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). And not only do objective measures of upper-class 
appurtenance not always correlate to subjective measures (Kraus et al., 2009; Kraus et al., 
2011), but subjective measures have a bigger impact on life than objective ones (Adler et 
al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
12
Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit  4, Chapter 9
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
 Table 2. 
Demographics of Upper-Class Respondents and Populace 
Variables 
Populace a Upper-class Welch’s  95% CI Cohen’s 
M (SD) M (SD) t (df)  p LL UL d 
Gender b 0.48 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) -7.01  
(304436) 
<.001 -.06 -.03 -0.10 
Age 40.8 (16.0) 37.8 (15.2) 15.61 
(304121) 
<.001 2.59 3.33 0.19 
Education c 4.70 (2.23) 5.86 (2.15) -39.55 
(275363) 
<.001 -1.22 -1.10 -0.53 
Income d 4.57 (2.28) 6.62 (2.67) -59.49 
(282304) 
<.001 -2.12 -1.98 -0.83 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. a 0 = female and 1 = male. a 
Populace refers to the respondents who do not identify as upper classes. b Scale from 1 (primary 
education not completed) to 8 (university degree obtained). c Scale from 1 (lowest income group 
in the country) to 10 (highest income group in the country). 
Morality Measures 
I first provide a descriptive analysis of WVS morality items for upper classes and populace 
(i.e., respondents who do not identify as upper-class) on the full sample and by region. In a 
second step, the WVS dataset is used to construct a morality model aligned with the MFT 
using exploratory and then confirmatory factor analysis.  
Descriptive analysis 
Respondents of the WVS are asked if they would justify a range of behaviors on a 1 - 10 
Likert scale from 1 (always justifiable) to 10 (never justifiable). A sample item is “Avoiding a 
fare on public transportation.” Table 3 provides means values of the morality items and the 
Welch t-test comparison for the full sample and by region. On the full sample, upper-class 
respondents agree significantly more than the other classes in justifying 12/23 various 
behaviors such as accepting bribes (d = .19), sex under legal age of consent (d = .16), 
fighting with the police (d = .15), and cheating on taxes (d = .15). However, upper classes 
justify only one item significantly less than other classes (homosexuality, d = -.06). There is 
no significant difference between upper-class and populace on other items. 
Regional variations are observed: in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, upper 
classes justify significantly more than other classes from 8/23 (Asia) to 12/23 items (Africa) 
per region (.37 > ds > .08), and significantly less than other classes from 0/23 items (Africa 
and Europe) and 3/23 items (Asia) per region (-.09 > ds > -.16). In Oceania, there are no 
significant differences between the upper class and the populace, except for claiming undue 
government benefits (upper-class justify less than populace, d = -.43). In sum, upper classes 
tend to justify “immoral” behaviors more than other classes, and regional differences such 
as in Asia might be related to a definition of self that is socially interdependent (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). 
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 Table 3 
Mean, Standard Deviations and Welch t-test Comparison for Populace and Upper-class Groups, by Region, for the 23 Morality Items 
of the WVS (n = 304637) 
Items 
Homosexuality Prostitution Sex under legal age  Divorce 
Populace  Upper class  Populace  Upper class  Populace  Upper class   Populace Upper class 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD) 
World  3.12*** (2.99) 2.95 (2.91) 2.59 (2.48) 2.69*** (2.62) 2.25 (2.34) 2.65*** (2.59) 4.61 (3.10) 4.56 (3.12) 
Africa  2.05 (2.12) 2.46*** (2.53) 2.08 (2.11) 2.57*** (2.66) 3.19 (2.97) 4.02* (3.16) 3.72 (2.88) 3.95** (3.30) 
America  3.71*** (3.13) 3.21 (2.94) 2.87 (2.60) 2.63*** (2.43) 2.53 (2.58) 3.14*** (2.85) 5.15 (3.26) 5.14 (3.31) 
Asia  2.30 (2.31) 2.52*** (2.60) 2.01 (1.98) 2.39*** (2.47) 1.66 (1.98) 1.79 (1.70) 3.67 (2.77) 4.10*** (2.79) 
Europe  4.06 (3.44) 4.56*** (3.58) 3.11 (2.67) 3.69*** (2.93) 2.25 (2.36) 3.18*** (2.95) 5.87 (2.93) 6.04 (3.09) 
Oceania  5.50 (3.38) 4.71 (3.51) 4.47 (2.84) 4.52 (3.31) a a 6.51 (2.60) 6.02 (2.98) 
Items 
Euthanasia Abortion Fighting with the police  Suicide 
Populace  Upper class  Populace  Upper class  Populace Upper class   Populace Upper class 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD) 
World  3.68 (3.19) 3.64 (3.17) 3.35 (2.84) 3.53*** (2.92) 2.83 (2.47) 3.21*** (2.59) 2.20 (2.21) 2.46*** (2.51) 
Africa  2.48 (2.50) 3.35*** (3.02) 2.31 (2.25) 2.90*** (2.76) 2.83 (2.38) 3.80*** (2.81) 1.90 (1.98) 2.36*** (2.47) 
America  3.65 (3.20) 3.59 (3.16) 2.83 (2.68) 3.18*** (2.82) 2.73 (2.58) 3.26*** (2.71) 2.05 (2.11) 2.17 (2.34) 
Asia  3.24 (2.98) 3.35 (3.03) 2.86 (2.47) 3.44*** (2.78) 3.06 (2.43) 3.12 (2.42) 2.01 (1.99) 2.40*** (2.42) 
Europe  4.97 (3.34) 5.00 (3.41) 4.88 (3.03) 5.05 (3.19) 2.56 (2.28) 2.93 (2.64) 2.71 (2.55) 3.18*** (2.91) 
Oceania  6.30 (3.07) 6.03 (3.39) 5.31 (2.95) 5.36 (2.95) a a 3.12 (2.58) 3.76 (3.03) 
Items 
Killing in self-defense  Claiming undue benefits Avoiding fare on public transport Cheating on taxes 
Populace  Upper class  Populace  Upper class  Populace Upper class   Populace Upper class 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD) 
World  5.42 (3.52) 5.54 (3.45) 2.57 (2.45) 2.77*** (2.68) 2.56 (2.41) 2.78*** (2.70) 2.23 (2.18) 2.61*** (2.60) 
Africa  4.82 (3.60) 5.28 (3.51) 2.41 (2.36) 2.70** (2.64) 2.42 (2.35) 2.77 (2.67) 2.20 (2.19) 2.65*** (2.59) 
America  5.66 (3.55) 6.36*** (3.31) 2.72 (2.68) 3.04*** (2.95) 2.92 (2.74) 2.90 (2.75) 2.10 (2.14) 2.42** (2.48) 
Asia  5.32** (3.50) 4.94 (3.41) 2.69 (2.47) 2.77 (2.65) 2.27 (2.17) 2.70*** (2.68) 2.06 (2.03) 2.60*** (2.65) 
Europe  5.35 (3.42) 5.43 (3.51) 2.50 (2.29) 2.51 (2.44) 2.82 (2.48) 2.97 (2.70) 2.61 (2.38) 2.88** (2.62) 
Oceania  a a 1.88*** (1.78) 1.23 (0.68) 2.14 (1.87) 1.84 (1.95) 2.07 (1.92) 1.98 (2.04) 
Items 
Accepting a bribe Joyriding  Taking soft drugs  Throwing away litter  
Populace  Upper class  Populace  Upper class  Populace Upper class  Populace Upper class 
M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
World  1.80 (1.79) 2.19*** (2.69) 1.61 (1.62) 1.69 (1.73) 1.49 (1.57) 1.62** (1.71) 1.68 (1.70) 1.76 (1.69) 
Africa  2.03 (2.03) 2.49** (2.49) 2.29 (2.19) 2.61 (2.55) 1.98 (1.96) 2.05 (2.01) 1.93 (1.70) 2.22 (1.88) 
America  1.70 (1.71) 1.85 (1.97) 1.67 (1.78) 1.81 (1.99) 1.63 (1.84) 1.81* (1.98) 1.87 (2.01) 1.88 (1.84) 
Asia  1.77 (1.75) 2.28*** (2.36) 1.49 (1.40) 1.47 (1.28) 1.24 (1.02) 1.29 (1.08) 1.57 (1.48) 1.64 (1.57) 
Europe  1.82 (1.76) 1.98* (2.01) 1.33 (1.04) 1.42 (1.5) 1.54 (1.65) 2.09** (2.33) 1.39 (1.24) 1.49 (1.39) 
Oceania  1.41 (1.25) 1.29 (0.79) a a a a a a 
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Items 
 
Driving under influence  Buying stolen goods Political assassination  Failing to report a parking accident  
 Populace  Upper class  Populace Upper class  Populace Upper class   Populace  Upper class 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
World  1.57 (1.54) 1.73*** (1.68) 1.82 (1.77) 1.87 (1.89) 1.86 (1.96) 1.88 (1.92) 2.40 (2.36) 2.48 (2.36) 
Africa  1.80 (1.73) 2.01 (2.14) 1.82 (1.76) 1.84 (1.91) 2.35 (2.30) 2.74 (2.66) 2.44 (2.15) 3.14** (2.72) 
America  1.65 (1.74) 1.82* (1.79) 1.78 (1.78) 1.85 (1.90) 1.80 (1.98) 1.78 (1.89) 2.91 (2.77) 3.03 (2.72) 
Asia  1.48 (1.37) 1.60 (1.50) 1.77 (1.69) 1.85 (1.85) 1.93 (1.97) 1.84 (1.80) 2.04 (1.92) 1.97 (1.84) 
Europe  1.47 (1.31) 1.76* (1.62) 1.89 (1.83) 1.93 (1.93) 1.66 (1.69) 1.70 (1.72) 1.78 (1.83) 2.16 (2.09) 
Oceania  a a 1.60 (1.48) 2.56 (2.73) a a a a 
Items 
 
Lying  Adultery  Keeping money found   
 Populace  Upper class  Populace Upper class  Populace Upper class    
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)     
World  2.85 (2.55) 2.90 (2.47) 2.43 (2.43) 2.58* (2.43) 3.70 (3.20) 3.55 (3.03)   
Africa  3.55 (3.02) 3.99 (2.93) 2.92 (2.82) 2.83 (2.49) 3.98 (3.20) 3.79 (2.90)   
America  2.95 (2.69) 3.14 (2.67) 2.88 (2.76) 3.11 (2.77) 4.99 (3.52) 5.04 (3.33)   
Asia  2.79*** (2.44) 2.45 (2.07) 1.89 (1.87) 1.96 (1.82) 2.39* (2.19) 2.21 (1.96)   
Europe  2.46 (2.16) 3.21*** (2.56) 2.42 (2.29) 3.17** (2.79) 3.46 (3.05) 4.11* (3.26)   
Oceania  a a a a a a   
 
Note: Scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable).  
a No data for Oceania. *** < .001, ** <.01, * < .05, for significantly higher mean values. 
A Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso.  
America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, USA, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yemen.  
Europe: Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, Albania, Andorra, Bosnia, 
Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland.  
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand. 
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Table 4 
Factor Loadings and Communalities, Based on Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin 
Rotation for the 23 Morality Items of the WVS (n = 10969) 
 
Moral Foundation  Socially binding   Individualizing 
Commu-
nalities 
MFT Domains  Purity / Sanctity  Authority / Respect  
Fairness / 
Reciprocity 
 
Factors 
Purity 
(α = .73) 
Death  
 (α = .66) 
Authority 1 
(α = .64) 
Authority 2 
 (α = .85) 
Cheat others 
(α = .63) 
Homosexuality -.83         .73 
Prostitution -.70         .65 
Sex under legal age -.47         .46 
Divorce -.42  .52       .59 
Euthanasia   .68       .52 
Abortion   .60       .57 
Fighting with the police   .50       .49 
Suicide   .45  .41     .52 
Killing in self-defense   .48    .52   .52 
Claiming undue 
government benefits 
    .89     .67 
Cheating fare on public 
transport 
    .74     .60 
Cheating on taxes     .55     .51 
Accepting a bribe       .65   .53 
Joyriding       .70   .57 
Taking soft drugs       .60   .55 
Throwing away litter       .74   .53 
Driving under influence       .76   .60 
Buying stolen goods       .62   .58 
Political assassination       .65   .50 
Failing to report a parking 
accident 
         .41 
Lying         .65 .56 
Adultery -.41        .44 .49 
Keeping money found         .76 .62 
 
Note: |Factor loadings | < .4 are removed. Boldface indicates items kept for consistency measures 
 
Exploratory factor analysis 
To determine if the 23 observed morality items combine into morality latent constructs, I 
proceed in two steps: first, I explore if the 23 variables split into factors corresponding to the 
MFT domains at face validity; then, I use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test if the 
identified factors demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity, and if they are invariant 
by group, so they can be compared.  
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 Principal components analysis with oblimin rotation was applied on the 23 morality 
items for the full sample, leading to five factors2 (Table 4). The first factor invokes the “purity” 
aspect of the moral foundation, as it deals with sexual behaviors. The second factor includes 
items about death and is therefore related to sanctity (α = .66). The next two factors evoke 
cheating the administration (α =.64), and breaking social rules without especially hurting or 
being unfair to others (α = .85): they relate to the authority/respect domain and are labelled 
“authority 1” and “authority 2.” Political assassination, which loads on authority 2, is removed 
as it lacks face validity with this domain. The last factor suggests a relationship to 
fairness/reciprocity, as it evokes cheating other individuals (α = .63). Finally, the item failing 
to report a parking accident is not used because loadings are < .4.  
Confirmatory factor analysis 
The confirmatory factor analysis proceeds in three steps: first, CFA is applied on the full 
sample (after data screening and listwise removal of missing-at-random values) and 
optimized according to modification indices; then, the adjusted model is applied to populace 
and upper-class groups separately to confirm fit; finally, model invariance across the two 
groups is tested, to allow the comparison of their mean values (He & van de Vijver, 2012).  
The initial model’s goodness of fit is low (see Table 5). The model is therefore 
optimized using modification indices, adding error terms covariance, and removing items 
with loadings < .4 (Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). The “purity” and “death” 
constructs are combined into a single latent variable labelled purity/sanctity, because their 
correlation is > .85 (Kline, 2005). Although they both relate to the authority/respect domain, 
the “authority 1” and “authority 2” constructs are discriminated (r = .73), implying cheating 
on social benefits and public services is assessed differently from breaking the law. The 
adjusted model (Figure 1) using 17 morality items demonstrates acceptable fit with the data 
(χ2[104] = 2101.15, p < .001; χ2[104] = 20.20; CFI = .966; NFI = .964; RMSEA = .042), 
acceptable convergence (standardized loadings > .43; Kline, 2005), and discriminant validity 
between constructs (correlation between constructs < .73; Kline, 2005). To allow between-
group comparison, invariance is verified using the decrease in CFI from configural to metric, 
and to scalar models (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002)3. Both metric and scalar invariance are 
obtained on the whole sample (see Table 5).  
                                               
2  Listwise non-missing sample is large enough to run the analysis: n = 10969, and culturally 
representative as only Oceania respondents are missing. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
adequacy is .93 (above the recommended value of .6), and Barlett’s test of sphericity is significant, 
χ2 (253) = 82074.55, p < .001, thus factor analysis was considered feasible with the 23 items. 
Principle component analysis provided five factors, but seven items load on two factors. To 
achieve a simpler structure, Oblimin rotation with Kaiser Normalization is applied and produces 
an identifiable solution with five factors. Finally, the communalities (all > .3) indicate items share 
variance with each other (Table 3).  
3  In order to compare means between groups (i.e. populace and upper class), constructs should 
demonstrate full score (or scalar) equivalence (He & van de Vijver, 2012). The analysis proceeds 
in three steps: first a configural model (using the two groups) is created for baseline. For testing 
metric invariance, only factor loadings are fixed across groups, and the decrease in fit from the 
configural to this “metric” model is tested. The non-significance of fit difference indicates 
measurement weights for populace and for upper class do not differ. For testing scalar invariance, 
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 Table 5 
Summary of Model 2 Fit and Invariance for Groups Populace and Upper Class 
 
Model n χ2 df NFI RMSEA CFI ΔCFI a 
Initial model- full 
sample 
10969 9296.74 179 .874 .068 .877  
Optimized model - full 
sample 
10969 2101.15 104 .964 .042 .966  
Single group model – 
populace b 
8539 1733.54 104 .963 .043 .965  
Single group model - 
upper class b 
1084 423.76 104 .936 .053 .951  
Configural invariance 9623 2157.45 208 .960 .031 .964  
Metric invariance 9623 2195.13 221 .959 .030 .963 -.001 * 
Scalar invariance 9623 2336.30 238 .957 .030 .961 -.003 * 
a ΔCFI = CFI metric - CFI configural for metric invariance. ΔCFI = CFI scalar - CFI configural for scalar invariance. 
b Social class information is missing for n = 1346 respondents. * ΔCFI < .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). 
 
The same invariance test is conducted on each country-wave case, with the optimized 
model (four constructs) in cases where all observable variables are available (eight cases). 
For cases where the 17 morality items are not available, a simplified model (including the 
eight items for the purity/sanctity and the authority 1 constructs) is used for invariance test. 
A total of 159 cases with non-missing variables are tested, among which a) for 80 cases the 
upper class sample size is too small to run the invariance test, b) for three cases the 
invariance tests cannot be rejected, and c) for 75 cases (49 countries, n = 106053) both 
metric and scalar invariance are obtained. Only these cases are used in the next sections 
(for the list of 75 cases, see note in Table 6). 
Results 
The primary goal is to analyze the extent of the morality gap between upper classes and 
others. Because measures’ means and variances of morality are expected to vary within 
country (Gibbs et al., 2007; Haidt, 1995; Haidt et al., 1993; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Shweder  
 
                                               
both factor loadings and intercept are fixed equal across groups in a “scalar” model. The absence 
of significant difference in fit between the configural and the scalar models demonstrates the latent 
constructs would produce same observable measures for populace and for upper class, and only 
if this condition is fulfilled, can straightforward group mean comparison be realized (He & van de 
Vijver, 2012). Typically, χ2 difference between models is tested to confirm significance in fit 
difference. This method cannot be used here, as χ2 for each model and subsequently Δχ2 between 
models are always significant due to large sample sizes. For large sample sizes, Cheung and 
Rensvold (2002) propose instead to analyze the decrease in CFI between models: ΔCFI < .01 
indicates the null hypotheses for the tested invariance should not be rejected.  
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 Figure 1. Optimized morality model with standardized loadings  
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 et al., 1987; Snarey, 1985), respondents’ measure of morality is standardized as a z-score 
by country and wave (Fischer, 2004). Then for each country-wave case, the mean value for 
upper-class respondents’ z-scores is compared to the mean value for the remaining (or 
populace) respondents’ z-scores, using a Welch t-test as the two groups have different 
sample sizes (Welch, 1947).  
Morality Gap Between Upper Class and Populace 
Purity/sanctity (75 cases) 
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on the 
purity/sanctity for each case. Among the 75 cases, upper classes provide significantly higher 
justification on 15 cases. Although significance is not reached, upper-class respondents 
justify the “immoral” behaviors more than populace in most cases (61/75). Reversely, upper-
class respondents show significantly less justification than non-upper-class respondents on 
only two cases.  
Authority/respect (75 cases) 
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on 
authority 1 constructs for each case. Among the 75 cases, upper classes provide 
significantly higher justification on 8 cases. Although significance is not reached, upper-class 
respondents justify the “immoral” behaviors more than non-upper-classes in most cases 
(47/75). Reversely, upper-class respondents show significantly less justification than non-
upper-class respondents on seven cases.  
Fairness/reciprocity (eight countries, wave 1989-1993) 
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on the 
cheating others construct for the available eight cases. Upper classes justification of moral 
constructs is higher for 5/8 cases, and significantly so for Argentina and Spain (ds = .25). In 
none of the countries are upper classes significantly less justifying.  
In conclusion, compared with the populace of their own country, respondents who 
identify as upper-class generally show more lenience for all moral constructs, not only in the 
socially binding domains of authority/respect and purity/sanctity, but also in 
fairness/reciprocity. The results confirm prior literature arguing that power might encourage 
individuals to take more risks (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008), 
because they have a heightened sense of control (Kraus et al., 2012) that inhibits threat-
driven obedience to rules (Piff et al., 2012). But especially the results provide novel evidence 
that upper classes see the morality of purity/sanctity with more lenience than other classes. 
As proposed by morality scholars, upper classes might “moralize" sexuality and death-
related behaviors less than other classes (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009).  
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 Geographical Variations in Morality Gap.  
To shed light on regional differences and confirm the morality gap outside of WEIRD 
countries, the 75 cases are grouped into sub-regions (link to Table 6).  
On purity/sanctity, the mean value for the upper classes is higher (or more lenient) 
than that of other classes in 15/18 sub-regions and significantly so in 8/18 sub-regions: 
South and Western Africa, North and South America, Southeast and Southern Asia, and 
Northern and Southern Europe (.32 > ds > .11). On authority/respect, the mean value for 
the upper classes is higher than that of other classes in 13/18 sub-regions, and significantly 
so in 5/18 sub-regions: Western Africa, North America, Central Asia, Southeast and 
Southern Asia, and Southern Europe (.55 > ds > .09). Finally, on fairness/reciprocity, the 
mean value for the upper classes is higher vs. other classes in 4/6 sub-regions, and 
significantly so in one sub-region: Southern Europe (d = .25). Only in one sub-region was 
the upper classes’ justification significantly lower other classes (in Western Asia, for 
authority/respect, d = -.13). The review of results by sub-regions confirms a tendency for 
upper class to be more lenient than populace in many regions of the world beyond WEIRD 
countries. 
Do the results support the unrestricted low morality hypothesis, or rather the selective 
low morality hypothesis, which states that upper classes in highly developed countries might 
display lower morality in socially binding domains (e.g., purity/sanctity and 
authority/respect), but not in individualizing (e.g., fairness/reciprocity) domains? Among 
countries where fairness/reciprocity was measured, Spain and Japan were classified as 
“high income,” India and Nigeria as “lower middle income,” and other countries as “upper 
middle income” (World Development Indicators for year 1990, The World Bank). In high 
income countries, Japanese upper classes were stricter (vs. populace) on both domains (d 
< -.02), and Spanish upper classes were significantly more lenient (vs. populace) on both 
domains (d > .24). In lower income countries, Indian upper classes were more lenient in 
authority/respect (d = .04), but less lenient (vs. populace) on fairness/reciprocity (d = -.09), 
whereas Nigerian upper classes were more lenient (vs. populace) on both domains (d > .02). 
Such results do not confirm the “selective” morality loss of upper classes in developed 
countries, but rather lend support to an unrestricted low morality hypothesis, independent 
from the level of economic development. Nevertheless, the relative loss of morality of upper 
classes is not universal, and societal variables might arguably moderate this general 
tendency.  
Changes in Morality Over Time 
Is the gap between upper classes and the others widening or narrowing over time? To 
answer this question, multi-wave constructs (purity/sanctity and authority/respect) and multi-
wave country samples (43 cases, 17 countries with at least two waves) are used. 
Fairness/reciprocity is not included in the analysis, as only one wave is available. First, the 
analysis is pursued with the 43 cases’ means for upper-class respondents’ z-score: 
regression is run on this sample of 43 values to determine if upper classes’ morality becomes  
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 Table 6 
Mean Values of the Moral Constructs (Standardized by Country and Wave), with 95% 
Confidence Intervals, for Cases with Scalar Invariance (n = 106053) for Populace and 
Upper Class. 
 
Moral domains  
by sub-region 
Populace  Upper Class  Welch’s  
p 
 95% CI  
Cohen’s 
d 
M (SD)  M (SD)  t-test (df)   LL UL 
Purity/Sanctity -0.00 (0.73)  0.11 (0.81)  -8.43 (106051) <.001 -0.15 -0.09 .14 
Eastern Africaa1 0.00 (0.70)  -0.01 (0.49)  0.14 (1525) ns -0.19 0.21 .02 
North Africa a2 -0.00 (0.85)  0.25 (1.10)  -1.35 (1807) ns -0.64 0.13 .26 
South Africa a3 -0.01 (0.80)  0.15 (0.80)  -3.09 (10819) .002 -0.25 -0.05 .19 
Western Africa a4 -0.01 (0.77)  0.17 (0.90)  -3.73 (5607) <.001 -0.28 -0.09 .22 
Central America a5 0.00 (0.73)  0.09 (0.77)  -1.59 (6115) ns -0.19 0.02 .11 
Latin America a6 0.00 (0.74)  -0.07 (0.61)  1.16 (2705) ns -0.05 0.19 -.11 
North America a7 -0.00 (0.74)  0.25 (0.86)  -2.38 (5278) .020 -0.46 -0.04 .31 
South America a8 -0.01 (0.68)  0.15 (0.75)  -4.57 (14306) <.001 -0.22 -0.09 .21 
Central Asia a9 -0.01 (0.70)  0.11 (0.82)  -0.93 (988) ns -0.37 0.14 .15 
East Asia a10 -0.00 (0.68)  0.06 (0.71)  -1.19 (2699) ns -0.16 0.04 .09 
South East Asia a11 -0.00 (0.78)  0.20 (0.91)  -2.70 (6148) .008 -0.35 -0.06 .24 
Southern Asia a12 -0.01 (0.76)  0.08 (0.90)  -2.87 (12127) .004 -0.15 -0.03 .11 
Western Asia a13 0.00 (0.67)  -0.01 (0.62)  0.36 (10359) ns -0.05 0.07 .02 
Eastern Europe a14 -0.00 (0.71)  0.11 (0.82)  -1.55 (6708) ns -0.26 0.03 .15 
Northern Europe a15 0.00 (0.67)  0.22 (0.72)  -2.10 (3639) .041 -0.43 -0.01 .31 
Southern Europe a16 -0.01 (0.72)  0.27 (0.94)  -3.70 (6953) <.001 -0.42 -0.13 .32 
Western Europe a17 -0.00 (0.74)  0.10 (0.70)  -1.53 (5159) ns -0.24 0.03 .14 
Oceania a18 -0.00 (0.74)  0.15 (0.86)  -0.84 (3085) ns -0.53 0.22 .19 
Authority/Respect a -0.00 (0.79)  0.04 (0.85)  -3.11 (106051) .002 -0.07 -0.02 .05 
Eastern Africa a1 0.00 (0.87)  -0.01 (0.92)  0.06 (1525) ns -0.36 0.38 -.01 
North Africa a2 0.00 (0.81)  0.08 (0.92)  -0.51 (1807) ns -0.40 0.24 .09 
South Africa a3 -0.01 (0.86)  0.05 (0.87)  -1.01 (10819) ns -0.15 0.05 .06 
Western Africa a4 -0.01 (0.80)  0.13 (0.87)  -3.00 (5607) .003 -0.23 -0.05 .17 
Central America a5 -0.00 (0.74)  0.02 (0.74)  -0.50 (6115) ns -0.13 0.08 .03 
Latin America a6 0.00 (0.74)  0.00 (0.69)  -0.01 (2705) ns -0.14 0.14 .00 
North America a7 -0.00 (0.79)  0.24 (1.05)  -1.91 (5278) .061 -0.50 0.01 .26 
South America a8 0.00 (0.73)  -0.04 (0.71)  1.29 (14306) ns -0.02 0.10 -.05 
Central Asia a9 -0.02 (0.79)  0.45 (0.90)  -3.40 (988) .001 -0.75 -0.19 .55 
East Asia a10 0.00 (0.73)  -0.03 (0.70)  0.56 (2699) ns -0.07 0.13 -.04 
South East Asia a11 -0.00 (0.81)  0.19 (0.86)  -2.64 (6148) .009 -0.33 -0.05 .23 
Southern Asia a12 -0.01 (0.78)  0.07 (0.91)  -2.32 (12117) .021 -0.13 -0.01 .09 
Western Asia a13 0.00 (0.79)  -0.10 (0.87)  2.43 (10359) .016 0.02 0.19 -.13 
Eastern Europe a14 -0.00 (0.79)  0.01 (0.81)  -0.21 (6708) ns -0.16 0.13 .02 
Northern Europe a15 0.01 (0.75)  0.04 (0.82)  -0.28 (3639) ns -0.27 0.20 .04 
Southern Europe a16 -0.01 (0.79)  0.16 (0.95)  -2.28 (6953) .024 -0.32 -0.03 .19 
Western Europe a17 -0.01 (0.77)  0.04 (0.89)  -0.56 (5159) ns -0.22 0.12 .07 
Oceania a18 0.01 (0.82)  -0.14 (0.77)  0.90 (3085) ns -0.19 0.48 -.18 
Fairness/Reciprocity -0.00 (0.75)  0.01 (0.74)  -0.66 (9621) ns -0.06 0.03 .02 
Western Africa b1 -0.00 (0.74)  0.01 (0.71)  -0.17 (860) ns -0.18 0.15 .02 
Central America b2 -0.09 (0.77)  0.08 (0.82)  -1.10 (1183) ns -0.24 0.07 .11 
South America b3 -0.00 (0.73)  0.03 (0.75)  -0.68 (3669) ns -0.12 0.06 .04 
East Asia b4 0.00 (0.86)  -0.01 (0.77)  0.24 (798) ns -0.12 0.15 -.02 
Southern Asia b5 0.01 (0.72)  -0.05 (0.64)  1.57 (2156) ns -0.02 0.14 -.09 
Southern Europe b6 -0.01 (0.77)  0.20 (0.86)  -2.10 (945) .039 -0.40 -0.01 .25 
 
 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; ns = no significant difference (p > .1). Boldface 
for significant difference between upper-class and populace. Boldface red for upper-class significantly less 
justifying than populace.  
a Measured with the construct authority 1.  
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 a1 Eastern Africa: Rwanda (Wave 6). a2 North Africa: Libya (W6). a3 South Africa: South Africa 
(W3/W4/W5/W6). a4 Western Africa: Mali (W5), Nigeria (W2/W3/W4). 
a5 Central America: Mexico (W2/W3/W4/W6). a6 Latin America: Dominican Republic (W3), Puerto Rico (W3), 
Trinidad & Tobago (W5). a7 North America: Canada (W5), USA (W3/W4/W5). a8 South America: Argentina 
(W1/W2), Brazil (W2/W5), Chile (W2/W5), Columbia (W3/W6), Venezuela (W4). 
a9 Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan (W4). a10 East Asia: China (W1), Hong Kong (W6), Japan (W2). a11 South East 
Asia: Malaysia (W5), Philippines (W3/W4/W6), Singapore (W4). a12 Southern Asia: India (W2/W4/W5/W6) , Iran 
(W4/W5), Pakistan (W6). a13 Western Asia: Azerbaijan (W3/W6), Armenia (W3), Cyprus (W5), Georgia (W3), 
Turkey (W5). 
a14 Eastern Europe: Moldova (W4/W5), Poland (W3), Romania (W3/W5), Russia (W3), Ukraine (W5). a15 
Northern Europe: Finland (W5), Norway (W3), Sweden (W5). a16 Southern Europe: Bosnia (W3/W4), Croatia 
(W3), Montenegro (W4), Slovenia (W5), Spain (W2), Serbia & Montenegro (W1). a17 Western Europe: Germany 
(W5), Netherland (W6), Switzerland (W3/W5). 
a18 Oceania: Australia (W3/W5). 
b1 Western Africa: Nigeria (W2). b2 Central America: Mexico (W2). b3 South America: Argentina (W2), Brazil 
(W2), Chile (W2), b4 East Asia: Japan (W2). b5 Southern Asia: India (W2). b6 Southern Europe: Spain (W2). 
 
 
more lenient (i.e., the mean value increases) with increasing wave values. For the 17 
countries, I also compare the earliest case’s means with the latest case’s means, to estimate 
change. Second, the analysis is done at the respondent level, for the 17 countries 
individually, to shed light on geographical variations.  
Linear regression is applied on the 43 cases’ means for upper classes on both 
constructs, with wave number (1 = 1981-1989 to 6 = 2010-2014) as a predictor. Wave does 
not predict cases’ means for purity/sanctity (p = .195) but does predict an increase in cases’ 
mean for authority/respect (β = .27, t(41) = 1.77, p = .084), and explains a significant 
proportion of variance (R2 = .07, F(1,41) = 3.13, p = .084). See Figures 2 and 3 for illustration. 
In addition, a t-test comparison was run between cases’ means for upper classes on the 
earliest and the latest wave by country. Although there is an increase in upper classes’ 
country mean between the oldest waves (for purity/sanctity M = 0.09, SD = 0.15; for 
authority/respect M. = 0.04, SD = 0.19) and the newest waves (respectively M = 0.19, SD = 
0.22; M = 0.12, SD = 0.27), the difference does not reach significance (ps > .120) probably 
because of the small sample size, which invites for a country-by-country review.  
The regression analysis was run on the z-scores of upper-class respondents, for 
each of the 17 countries with multi-wave data (see additional Figures in the supplementary 
file). Wave significantly predicted an increase of upper classes’ justifying more purity/sanctity 
in Chile (β = .35, t(150) = 4.58, p < .001) and in India (β = .13, t(768) = 3.66, p < .001), but 
a decrease in Brazil (β = -.15, t(136) = 1.78, p = .078). Wave was not a significant predictor 
of purity/sanctity for other countries (ps > .129). Wave also significantly predicted an 
increase of upper classes’ justifying more authority/respect in Brazil (β = .18, t(136) = 2.08, 
p = .040), in India (β = .21, t(768) = 5.98, p < .001), in Romania (β = .35, t(274) = 2.11, p 
= .043) and in the USA (β = .32, t(52) = 2.40, p = .020), but not in other countries (ps > .127). 
In conclusion, the analysis of time-trends seems to indicate a progressive widening of the 
morality gap between upper classes and other classes in few tested countries, on both 
domains of purity/sanctity and authority/respect. The narrowing of morality gap was only 
observed in Brazil for purity/sanctity.  
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Figure 2. Trend of z-scores for upper-class and populace on purity/sanctity. (CI = Confidence 
Interval. Populace in plain lines, upper class in dotted lines). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trend of z-scores for upper-class and the populace on authority/respect. (CI = 
Confidence Interval. Populace in plain lines, upper class in dotted lines). 
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 Limitations 
The study has several limitations. First, the research exclusively uses a set of questions 
from the WVS that were not directly designed to assess the moral foundation questionnaire 
itself. As such, this study only provides a good assessment on purity/sanctity, 
authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity domains, but ignores harm/care and in-group 
loyalty. A wider range of measures that fully represent the moral foundation theory should 
be analyzed in the future. Another inherent limitation is the self-reporting aspect of WVS 
responses. Finally, the causality of the morality-power link remains unclear: although 
experimental studies have demonstrated the effect of power on individuals’ moral judgment, 
research is lacking as to whether those who disregard morality have an advantage in 
accessing power, or not.  
Conclusions 
The objective of this study was not to compare morality across cultures, but to expand 
research on the power-morality link outside of WEIRD countries (Henrich et al., 2010). The 
WVS database reveals that upper-class respondents (vs. other classes) are less strict on 
various aspects of morality (e.g., driving drunk, receiving bribes, fighting with the police, 
suicide, or prostitution). The variables provided in the WVS reveal latent moral constructs 
aligned with the MFT (purity/sanctity, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity), and the 
gap between upper and other classes is replicated on these constructs.  
The morality gap is, however, not monolithic. Although the study demonstrates a link 
between upper-class and lower morality, not all upper-class respondents differ from others. 
For example, the upper-class respondents are significantly more likely than other classes to 
justify a bribe. But the large majority of upper-class respondents still share the same opinion 
as others: 67% of the upper-class vs. 74% for other classes considers bribing never 
justifiable.  
Second, geographical and time differences indicate that the class-related moral gap 
is not a universal characteristic of every society: first, the moral gap between upper classes 
and populace is not significant in all regions of the world and for each moral domain. Second, 
class-related morality difference might be widening with time in some societies, but not all. 
In conclusion, although upper classes are not always expressing moral divergence from 
others, the gap is prevalent and widening in many of the world’s regions.  
How, then, can those in positions of power be kept in check? Among WVS 
respondents, those who perceive they belong to upper-class react less intensely to the 
suggestions of illegal (e.g., taking drugs, drunk driving) and anti-social (adultery, cheating 
on public transportation) behaviors, probably because the perception of status and power 
promotes disinhibition as well as self-interest (Keltner et al., 2003; Fiske, 1993). However, 
upper-class respondents from several sub-regions (i.e., Western Asia, East Asia, Latin and 
South America, and Oceania) displayed less lenience than other classes in few domains. 
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 Reducing or even reversing the morality gap is therefore feasible and should be pursued as 
an avenue for further research. 
Implications for Future Research 
Like many other social occurrences, the social class divergence in morality requires 
monitoring and corrective social action. Individuals who perceive they belong to the upper-
class probably “moralize” less (Ellemer et al., 2008; Horberg et al., 2009) or perceive that 
their social group obeys a different set of rules (Sidanius et al., 2000). Therefore, enforcing 
social controls to ensure power holders are accountable to the whole society appears 
necessary to ensure that they share the moral judgment of others (e.g., Pitesa & Thau, 
2013). A domain-by-domain assessment of morality is however required because upper-
class might be at the forefront of social progress when, for example, they challenge unequal 
gender roles or discrimination based on sexual orientation. But when power holders’ 
attitudes defy general social rules, then distrust in elites, institutions, and in democracy itself 
surges (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). Societies where those in power are allowed too 
much moral lenience may find themselves placed precariously on a slippery slope, as 
population may growingly wonder why they should fulfill their side of the social contract.  
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Recommended Videos 
On the loss of empathy (or banality of evil) and the struggle with in-group loyalty, I 
recommend Anna Arendt (film): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KDO5u2YSbm 
 
On the morality of power and the manipulation of youths, I recommend The Wave (Film): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9vdfb2f-B0 
 
On the morality of animals, I recommend the capuchin monkey fairness experiment: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KSryJXDpZo  
Questions for Discussion 
1. Do animals have a sense of good and bad? In what species? Do you think animals’ 
sense of good and bad is innate or is learnt? What about humans: discuss if human’s 
sense of good and bad is innate or learnt. 
 
2. Can you think of morality items that are shared across countries, and items that differ by 
country? What aspects of culture (e.g., individualism/collectivism) might have an 
influence on morality? 
 
3. Discuss how people of lower and higher social classes may have different sets of moral 
judgment? Beyond education, how could social interaction (e.g., think of cooperation vs. 
competition) change your moral judgment? 
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 4. Do animals have a sense of social hierarchy? In what species? What could be the 
evolved benefit of such hierarchy? For humans what are the benefits of hierarchy? Of 
cooperation? 
 
5. Psychologists (and this article) mention a “paradox of power.” What does it mean? 
 
6. Do you know famous people who behaved in immoral ways, in sports, politics, business, 
clergy, and psychology? Why do you consider these behaviors to be immoral, and why 
famous or powerful individuals might not feel the same way about morality? 
 
7. Based on your experience, how would having power over other people make you change 
your behavior, and ultimately, your moral judgment? 
 
8. Do you see reasons why people who have power in our society (e.g., business and 
political leaders) should be allowed to behave with moral leniencies? If you cannot see 
any reason, what solutions could you propose (in business and in political practices) to 
limit the immoral behavior of leaders? 
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